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Motivated by the lack of sub-national empirical evidence on the relationship between aid and 
institutional development, this study explores the local effects of World Bank aid on perceived 
institutional quality in African aid receiving countries. We combine geo-referenced data on the 
subnational allocation of World Bank aid projects to Africa over the 1995-2014 period with geo-coded 
survey data for 73,640 respondents across 12 Sub-Saharan African countries. To account for the 
endogenous placement of World Bank project sites, we compare the estimated effect of living near a site 
where a World Bank project was under implementation or completed at the time of the interview, to that 
of living near a site where we know that a World Bank project appeared after the survey date.  The 
empirical results suggest a positive impact of World Bank aid on perceived institutional quality, as 
measured by citizens’ expressed willingness to abide by key formal institutions. This applies even if we 
consider overall World Bank aid, i.e. not just projects specifically targeted at institutional development. 
As may be expected, however, the estimated effects are more pronounced when restricting our attention 
to projects focusing on institution building. Notably, the observed effects concern finalized projects, not 
projects still under implementation, highlighting that institutional change is a slow process.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
One of the goals established in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is to ‘build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’ (UN, 2015). While the importance of building 
well-functioning state institutions in developing countries is uncontroversial (North, 1990; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), the question of whether donors are actually helpful in this process 
is more contentious.  
 An aid optimist would argue that an inflow of resources and technical assistance can help 
recipient countries boost government effectiveness, and that aid (and the threat of not receiving 
aid) can persuade states to embark on reform. An aid skeptic, however, would argue that aid 
promotes rent-seeking behavior and reduces the incentives for democratic accountability and thus 
the democratic pressures to build effective institutions. 
 Donors themselves unsurprisingly fall in the former category. The World Bank, in focus in 
this paper, emphasize their commitment to promoting good governance and institution building. 
In their own words: “Capable, accountable and inclusive governance is at the heart of the World 
Bank’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity” (International 
Development Association, 2021). Support to public institutions, public financial management, 
government revenue generation, corporate governance, decentralization and sub-national 
governance are some of the strategic priorities they highlight (World Bank, 2020). Examples of 
World Bank projects focusing on institution building in African partner countries include 
assistance to improve judicial services in Kenya, training in accountability and public financial 
management of government and civil society organization staff in Burkina Faso, and a 
decentralization program promoting citizen engagement in Mauretania (World Bank, 2018; 
International Development Association, 2019).  
 The empirical evidence on the relationship between aid and institutions is mixed, and so does 
little to resolve the controversy between aid optimists and aid sceptics (e.g. Svensson, 2000; 
Tavares, 2003; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008; Busse and 
Gröning, 2009; Okada and Samreth; 2012; Jones and Tarp, 2016). In light of conflicting 
predictions, conflicting empirical evidence is arguably not surprising.  
 Nonetheless, an additional reason for the inconclusive results may be the tendency to study 
the relationship at the country level. While useful for uncovering broad patterns, the macro 
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literature on aid effectiveness, focusing on country level relationships between aid inflows and 
outcomes, face important challenges. First, it is notoriously difficult to establish causality. 
Receiving aid is associated with a multitude of country characteristics – known and unknown – 
that will tend to influence the estimates when seeking to establish the causal impact of aid (e.g. 
Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Second, it is common to aggregate over aid flows that should have 
different effects, since provided for different purposes. (Clemens et al., 2012; and Bourguignon 
and Gunning, 2016). Furthermore, even if taking steps to disaggregate aid and consider the impact 
of different aid flows (e.g. Jones and Tarp, 2016), the cross-country literature is not able to account 
for heterogeneity within countries. While (specific forms of) aid may have effects in targeted areas, 
these effects may not be sufficiently large to be measurable at the country level or they may be 
obscured by omitted variable bias (Dreher and Lohmann, 2015). Indeed, many development 
projects are targeted at local development, arguably meaning they should be judged against 
location-specific outcomes (Findley et al., 2011). Against this background, a finer lens is arguably 
needed when studying the effect of aid on institutions. 
 The aim of this paper is to investigate the local effects of aid on local institutional quality, as 
measured by citizens’ expressed willingness to abide by key formal institutions (the courts, the 
police and the tax authority), in Sub-Saharan African aid receiving countries. We explore a) the 
local effects of overall World Bank aid, b) the local effects of World Bank aid targeted specifically 
at institutional development, and c) potential donor heterogeneity in results using data on US and 
Chinese aid.  
 To address these questions, we geographically match a geo-referenced dataset on the 
subnational allocation of World Bank aid projects to Africa over the 1995-2014 period with 
Afrobarometer survey data for 73,640 respondents across 12 African countries. The main 
estimation strategy to account for the endogenous placement of World Bank project sites consists 
in comparing the estimated effect of living near a site where a World Bank project was either under 
implementation or completed at the time of the interview, to that of living near a site where we 
know that a World Bank project will appear subsequently. In alternative specifications we instead 
use matching, with very similar results.  
 The empirical findings, which are robust across a wide range of specifications, indeed suggest 
a positive impact of World Bank aid on perceived institutional quality in the local area. This applies 
even if we consider overall World Bank aid, i.e. not just aid projects specifically targeted at 
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institutional development. As may be expected, however, the estimated effects are more 
pronounced when we restrict our attention to projects focusing on institution building. Notably, 
the observed effects concern finalized projects, not projects still under implementation.  
 To our knowledge, this is the first study using geocoded aid data and geocoded institutional 
outcome data to systemically investigate the local effects of aid on perceived institutional quality 
in African aid-receiving countries. Broadly speaking, it contributes to two principal strands of 
literature. First, it makes an important contribution to the literature on the relationship between 
foreign aid and political institutions (e.g. Svensson, 2000; Tavares, 2003; Bräutigam and Knack, 
2004; Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008; Busse and Gröning, 2009; Okada and Samreth; 2012; 
Jones and Tarp, 2016), which to date has focused mainly on country level variation in aid and 
institutions.  
 Second, it contributes to the emerging literature evaluating sub-national effects of aid using 
geo-coded aid and outcome data (see e.g. Brazys et al., 2017; Civelli, et al., 2018; Isaksson and 
Kotsadam, 2018a,b; Kotsadam et al., 2018; Dreher et al., 2019). While rapidly growing, this 
literature has seen surprisingly few attempts to explore the effects of aid on institutional 
development. Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018a) find that Chinese aid stimulates local corruption in 
a sample of African countries, and Brazys et al. (2017) find that Chinese aid, unlike World Bank 
aid, fuels corruption in Tanzania. Furthermore, a couple of recent studies focus on the impact of 
aid on local institutional legitimacy in war-torn states. Based on panel data for around 5,000 
Afghan villages, Parks et al. (2019) find evidence that aid responsive to citizen needs strengthens 
the legitimacy of local and district government. Similarly, Carnegie et al. (2019), focusing on 
Syria, find a positive relationship between aid inflows and perceptions of local institutions, except 
in areas dominated by an outside force (ISIS).  The literature studying the effects of aid using geo-
coded aid and outcome data has, however, yet to systematically explore the local effects of aid on 
institutional quality in a broad sample of countries.  
 Being the first to do so, this paper makes several more specific contributions. By studying 
local as opposed to country level aid and institutions we hope to be able to capture effects of 
targeted aid that may not be picked up at the country level. Moreover, while the aforementioned 
identification problems still apply – aid is not distributed at random, neither within nor across 
countries – the use of sub-national data improves the prospects for causal identification. In 
particular, geo-coded data on aid and institutional outcomes allow us to compare localities affected 
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and not affected by development projects – before and after development project implementation 
– while controlling for potential confounding and omitted variables at relatively fine geographic 
levels. Furthermore, focusing on citizens’ willingness to abide by formal institutions should make 
us better able to capture de facto as opposed de jure institutions. And finally, by exploring effects 
of different forms of aid as well as donor heterogeneity in results, we address the concern that the 
aid effectiveness literature often aggregate over aid flows that, since provided for very different 
purposes, should have very different effects. 
 In the next section, we elaborate on the proposed theoretical mechanisms linking aid to 
political institutions, on the empirical evidence available to date, and the need for sub-national, 
disaggregated, analysis in the field. 
 
 2 Aid and political institutions 
 
‘Political institutions’ is a broad concept that is often used interchangeably with ‘governance’ or 
‘quality of government’. We follow in this tradition and think of political institutions as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 
4), which is the definition used by the World Bank when formulating their Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). The multi-dimensional nature of the concept is reflected in the theoretical and 
empirical discussions of the linkages between aid and institutions, which hardly suggest a simple, 
uni-directional effect of the former on the latter (Jones and Tarp, 2016). 
 
 2.1 Theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence 
Theoretically, the impact of aid on political institutions is inconclusive. According to one view, 
which can be summarized as ‘aid as finance’, aid helps simply by relaxing the budget constraint 
(Bourguignon and Gunning, 2016). Through the infusion of resources and technical assistance, aid 
can potentially boost government effectiveness (see e.g. the discussion in Bräutigam and Knack, 
2004; Djankov et al., 2008; and Charron, 2011). It can release governments from binding revenue 
constraints, thereby enabling them to strengthen domestic institutions and pay higher salaries to 
civil servants, and it can provide training and technical assistance to build important government 
functions and institutions such as legal systems and accounting offices. Donors can potentially 
bring in expertise that may be lacking in developing countries facing severe capacity constraints.  
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 According to another perspective, which can be thought of as ‘aid as reform’, aid can be used 
as an instrument for changing policies and institutions, by persuading states to embark on reform 
(Bourguignon and Gunning, 2016). Accountability could be enhanced due to international 
oversight, and conditionality measures stipulating that certain reforms must be in place to receive 
future aid may encourage institutional improvements.  
 A number of studies support these optimistic views on the potential of aid in building 
institutions. Goldsmith (2001) and Dunning (2004) find a positive relationship between aid and 
indicators of democracy and economic freedom in Africa.  Tavares (2003) and Okada and Samreth 
(2012) find that receiving aid is associated with reduced corruption levels. The results of Charron 
(2011) suggest that the work of multilateral, but not bilateral, donors have helped combat 
corruption. Studying democratic transitions in Africa 1989-2008, Dietrich and Wright (2015) find 
that economic aid increases the likelihood of transition to multiparty politics, while democracy aid 
furthers democratic consolidation. The findings of Jones and Tarp (2016) suggest a small positive 
net effect of total aid on political institutions, primarily driven by stable inflows of governance aid. 
 Others, however, argue that aid undermines local institutions by promoting rent-seeking 
behavior and by reducing the incentives for democratic accountability and thus the democratic 
pressures to build effective institutions (e.g. Easterly, 2006; Deaton, 2013). Fiscal contract theory 
(e.g. Dietrich, et al.2017; Baldwin and Winter, 2020) predicts that when revenues do not depend 
on the taxes raised from citizens and business, there is less incentive for accountability. Citizens 
who pay taxes can threaten to withhold those taxes if the government does not fulfill its role in 
providing public goods and social services. In contrast, where citizens are not the main financiers 
of government, citizens supposedly have less leverage over government, and governments have 
less incentive to respond to their citizenry (Baldwin and Winter, 2020). As in the ‘resource curse’ 
literature, linking natural resource rents to weaker government accountability (Djankov et al., 
2008; Morrison, 2012), foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries, and may 
result in the same rent-seeking behavior.   
 And as it turns out, there is empirical evidence to support these negative predictions on the 
effects of aid on institutional development too, with studies suggesting that large aid inflows 
stimulate corruption (Svensson, 2000; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004) and worsen democratic 
institutions (Djankov et al., 2008) and other governance outcomes (Busse and Gröning, 2009).  
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 Another concern is that aid contributes only to shallow institutional reform (Pritchett el a., 
2013; Buntaine et al., 2017). When donors make access to financing contingent upon achievement 
of performance targets, recipient countries may choose easy and shallow institutional targets that 
signal commitment to institution-building, what Buntaine et al. (2017) refer to as ‘form targets’, 
rather than ‘function targets’ capturing effectiveness at addressing public problems. An analysis 
of post-project evaluations of World Bank projects, suggest that countries that receive concessional 
(IDA as opposed to IBRD) financing based on performance criteria are indeed less likely to report 
function targets.  
  Several studies highlight the heterogeneous effects of aid on institutions. The extent to which 
there is a ‘political aid curse’ is often suggested to depend on the strength of democratic institutions 
in the recipient country to begin with (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Ahmed, 2012; 
Faye and Niehaus, 2012; Dutta et al., 2013), as well as on the degree of aid fungibility, in turn 
relating to conditions imposed by donors (Collier, 2006; Altincekic and Bearce, 2014; Jones and 
Tarp, 2016). The findings of Ear (2007), who disaggregate aid depending on its share of technical 
assistance and on its grant element, suggest that different forms of aid have different effects on 
different institutional outcomes at the country level. Exploring the intermediary role of institutions 
in the aid-growth relationship for a panel of African countries, Wako (2018) find significant donor 
heterogeneity.  
 
 2.2 Empirical takeaways 
Given the conflicting theoretical mechanisms discussed above, it is reasonable to view the 
empirical impact of aid on institutions as a net effect, the sign of which is ambiguous a priori (Jones 
and Tarp, 2016). If the optimistic ‘aid as finance’ and ‘aid as reform’ mechanisms outweigh 
possible negative effects from rent-seeking and weakened democratic accountability, we would 
expect the overall effect of aid on institutions to be positive. If the reverse holds, however, it should 
instead be negative.  
 In light of the conflicting theoretical predictions and inconclusive empirical findings at the 
country level, a main takeaway from the above discussion concerns the importance of evaluating 
heterogeneity. The literature points to important heterogeneity across types of aid and institutions, 
as well as across donors. Against this background, it seems reasonable to explore sub-national 
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variation in aid and institutions. This enables us to capture effects of regionally targeted aid that 
may not be picked up at the country level, and to explore variation across donors and types of aid.  
 Another takeaway concerns the importance of capturing de facto as opposed de jure 
institutions, or put differently, to go beyond form targets that do not necessarily translate into 
effectiveness at addressing problems experienced by citizens.  
 With this is mind, we construct a proxy for local institutional quality based on citizens’ 
expressed willingness to abide by key formal institutions. The idea is that this measure should 
capture confidence in, and thus perceived quality of, institutions. Just like country level 
institutional indices based on expert judgements (e.g. the aforementioned WGI), the indicator is 
based on perceptions, i.e. subjective accounts as opposed to objective criteria. Unlike country level 
indices of institutional development, however, this variable arguably enables us to get picture of 
de facto institutional quality – as experienced by citizens – at the local level. Importantly, perceived 
institutional quality is what should matter for economic behavior. 
 The distinction between national and local institutions is by no means clear-cut. Citizen 
perceptions of institutional quality will in all probability to some extent pick up media reports 
covering national institutions. Nonetheless, studying local institutional outcomes is clearly 
relevant, especially in a developing country context where the reach of central government 
institutions is often limited in remote rural areas. While de jure institutional arrangements may be 
formulated nationally, de facto implementation often takes place locally, and citizen assessments 
of whether institutions deliver will likely depend heavily on own experiences and the experiences 
of friends and family in the surrounding area.  
 That said, focusing on citizen reports also brings challenges. In particular, one may be 
concerned that perceptions of institutional quality are susceptible to signaling effects of receiving 
aid. These potential effects, too, are ambiguous. In line with fiscal contract theory, discussed 
above, a significant donor presence may signal that the government is performing badly, since it 
ostensibly has been unable to finance the concerned development project on its own, via taxes. 
Alternatively, however, citizens might credit their local authorities for bringing a project into their 
community. Indeed, the presence of externally funded projects may be seen as signals of the 




 In an attempt to disentangle such signaling effects from de facto institutional improvements, 
we will compare effects of aid projects at different points in the project implementation cycle. The 
idea is that signaling effects are likely to be most pronounced when donors are visible, under the 
project implementation phase, and that real institutional development is a slow process, taking 
some time to materialize.  
 In sum, we thus focus on the local effects of aid projects at different stages of implementation 
on perceived institutional quality in African aid receiving countries, comparing the effects of 
overall aid with those of aid targeted specifically at institutional development, and evaluating 
donor heterogeneity in results. In the next section, we discuss how to approach these issues 
empirically.  
 
 3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
To explore the local effects of aid on perceived institutional quality in Africa, we geographically 
match spatial data on World Bank aid projects to the continent over the period 1995-2014 with 
survey data for a large sample of respondents from a broad range of African countries,2 interviewed 
between 2002 and 2015. The survey data is obtained from rounds 2-6 of the Afrobarometer survey 
(geocoded by BenYishay et al., 2017). The aid project data is from AidData’s World Bank 
Geocoded Research Release, Version 1.4.2 (AidData, 2017). Focusing on World Bank aid has the 
advantage that they routinely geocode all their projects. For donor comparisons, however, we will 
focus on geocoded projects of selected bilateral donors in selected African recipient countries with 
sufficient data coverage (also from AidData).  
 The aid data contains latitude and longitude project co-ordinates, and provide information 
about the precision of the location identified (AidData Research and Evaluation Unit 2017). Being 
interested in the local effects of aid projects, we focus on projects with recorded locations coded 
as corresponding to an exact location or as ‘near’, in the ‘area’ of, or up to 25 km away from an 
exact location.3 We then use the coordinates of the surveyed Afrobarometer clusters, consisting of 
one or several geographically close villages or a neighborhood in an urban area, to match 
individuals to aid project sites with precise point coordinates. Specifically, we measure the distance 
                                                          
2 For the exact estimation sample we get after sample restrictions, see below. 
3 Precision categories 1 and 2 in Strandow et al. (2011). 
10 
 
from the cluster centre points to the aid project sites and identify the clusters located within a cut-
off distance – in the benchmark setup 10 km – of at least one project site. Figure 1 maps the World 
Bank projects along with the Afrobarometer survey clusters encircled by buffer zones, illustrating 
how we identify project sites within a cut-off distance of survey clusters.4 
 
Figure 1: Map of project sites and survey clusters surrounded by 25 km buffer zones [IN COLOUR] 
 
 
Our main outcome variable focuses on citizens’ expressed willingness to abide by a range of key 
state institutions. Specifically, our dependent variable is an index created as the first principal 
                                                          
4 We use a 25 km cut-off in the figure for better visibility of the buffer areas.  
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component (with mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) of the responses to questions on 
whether the respondents agree or disagree that a) the courts, b) the police and c) the tax authority 
has the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by, with response categories 
ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree. These questions have the advantage 
of broad coverage, both across countries and over time. The idea is that the resulting index should 
capture confidence in, and thus perceived quality of, key institutions. We deliberately focus on 
institutions not explicitly connected to any political party, or the executive branch of government, 
in order to capture perceived institutional quality rather than political alliances and satisfaction 
with the government.  
 The main explanatory variables, which will be described in greater detail below, focus on 
living near a World Bank project site – either a site where a project is being implemented at the 
time of the survey (Ongoing), a site where a project has been completed (Completed), or a site 
where a project will be opened but where implementation had not yet been initiated at the time of 
the survey (Future). 
 We restrict the sample to countries with a sufficient number of observations connected to both 
completed, ongoing and future project sites. This gives a benchmark estimation sample of 73,640 
respondents across 12 countries.5 Our sample countries contain 2641 ongoing, future or completed 
World Bank project sites with precise geocodes and information on start-date. The estimation 
strategy, described further below, will rely on identifying survey respondents within a specified 
distance – 10 km in the benchmark estimation – of project sites, i.e. in clusters where a completed, 
ongoing or future project lies within the specified cut-off distance.  
 In a first set of estimations, we consider overall aid, i.e. any World Bank development project 
irrespective of sector. This is in line with cross-country studies considering the relationship 
between aggregate aid flows and institutional outcomes. Bearing in mind that aid is given for many 
purposes other than institutional development, however, in a second set of estimations we restrict 
our attention to World Bank projects targeting the sector  ‘Public Administration, Law, and Justice’ 
(260 out of 2641 project sites). While we cannot be sure that all projects in this sectoral 
classification are targeted at institutional development, it should narrow down the spread of project 
objectives to some extent.  
                                                          




 Variable descriptions and summary statistics are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix. 
 
 3.1 Estimation strategy 
Just like the distribution of aid across countries, the distribution of aid within countries is not 
random, implying that some individuals and sub-national areas, with certain characteristics, will 
be more likely than others to be targeted by aid. For instance, donors may allocate aid to areas that 
stand out in terms of pre-existing infrastructure and institutional arrangements. Hence, assuming 
that there is no relationship between project localization and the pre-existing characteristics of 
project sites and of the population residing in the surrounding areas is not reasonable.  
 In order to deal with these empirical challenges, we use a spatial-temporal estimation 
strategy.6 In particular, rather than simply comparing people living close to and far away from 
project sites, we compare the estimated effects of living near sites where at some point a World 
Bank project has been, is or will be implemented. While the fact that the Afrobarometer is not a 
panel hinders us from following specific localities over time, before and after a project was 
initiated and later completed, with this estimation strategy, we can still make use of the time 
variation in the data 
 As such, we compare four groups of individuals: 1) those within 10 km of at least one ongoing 
project site (Ongoing, applying to around 30 percent of respondents), 2) those within 10 km of a 
site where a project has been completed prior to the interview date (Completed, applying to 
approximately 20 percent of respondents),7  3) those within 10 km of a site where a project will 
start, but where implementation was yet to begin at the survey date and not close to any ongoing 
projects (Future, applying to around 7 percent of respondents), and 4) those living more than 10 
km away from any project site (the omitted reference category in the regressions, applying to 59 
percent of respondents). The baseline regression takes the form: 
 
                                                          
6 Resembling that in Knutsen et al. 2017. See also Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018a and 2018b). 
7 Note that ongoing and completed are not mutually exclusive categories. In particular, many who have ongoing 
projects nearby also have completed projects within the cut-off distance.  Hence, these shares will not sum to one. In 
alternative estimations we break these treatment categories into three groups: those with only ongoing projects within 
the cut-off distance, those with both ongoing and completed projects within the cut-off distance, and those with only 
completed projects within the cut-off distance. 
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where the institutional outcome Y for an individual i in cluster v at year t is regressed on a dummy 
variable Ongoing capturing whether the individual lives within the specified cut-off distance of an 
ongoing World Bank project, Completed capturing whether s/he lives within the cut-off distance 
of a World Bank project that has been completed prior to the interview date, and a dummy Future 
for living close to a site where a World Bank project will take place but had not yet implemented 
at the time of the survey. To control for variation in average levels of perceived institutional quality 
across time and space, the regressions include country (and in alternative estimations region) fixed 
effects (𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠) and year fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖). To control for individual variation in perceptions of 
institutional quality, a vector (𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖) of individual-level controls from the Afrobarometer are 
included. The baseline set of individual controls are age, age squared, gender and urban/rural 
residence.8 To account for correlated errors, the standard errors are clustered at the geographical 
clusters (i.e., at the enumeration area level). 
 The coefficients on Ongoing (𝛽𝛽1) and Completed (𝛽𝛽2) capture any causal effects of having an 
ongoing or completed project nearby, plus potential selection effects. The coefficient on Future 
(𝛽𝛽3), on the other hand, captures only a selection effect (since the project has not started yet and 
so should not have a causal impact). The idea is that by taking the difference between Ongoing 
and Completed, on the one hand, and Future on the other, we subtract the selection effect from the 
combined selection and causal effect, leaving behind the causal effect of ongoing and completed 
aid projects on the institutional outcome variable of interest. The parameter difference between 
Ongoing and Future (𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽3) and between Completed and Future (𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽3) thus give a 
difference-in-difference type of measure that controls for unobservable time-invariant 
characteristics that may influence selection into being a World Bank project site.  
                                                          
8 Table A3 explores sample balance for the pre-treatment and treatment groups along these dimensions. Whereas 
people living close to World Bank projects tend to be somewhat younger than those with no World Bank project near 
them, there is no statistically significant age difference between the treatment and pre-treatment groups. Neither is 
there any gender imbalance between the groups. Next, people with World Bank projects nearby – whether ongoing, 
completed or future – are all more likely to live in urban areas. For overall World Bank aid, this tendency is slightly 
more pronounced for the treated groups. For World Bank aid targeted at institutional development the tendency is 




 The key assumption behind this approach is that the selection process relevant for ongoing, 
completed and future projects sites is the same. A potential concern would be if 
completed/ongoing/future project status picks up project timing and projects starting later differ 
systematically from projects starting earlier. Here it is important to note that there is no direct 
correspondence between when a project was implemented and whether it is coded as Completed, 
Ongoing or Future; the classification depends on project status at the time the Afrobarometer 
survey covered the particular area in question. That said, however, there is an over-representation 
of respondents connected to ongoing projects in the later survey waves, why we will evaluate 
possible effects of project timing in the sensitivity analysis. 
 Using the above approach to study whether World Bank aid projects affect local institutional 
quality, one has to make an assumption about the geographical reach of the potential effect. How 
far from project sites citizens experience its potential rewards is essentially an empirical question. 
We use a 10 km cut-off in the benchmark estimation, but evaluate alternative cut-offs for 
comparison. 
 
 4 Results 
 4.1 Overall World Bank aid 
Let us first consider the results of estimations focusing on overall World Bank aid, i.e. the impact 
of living near any World Bank project, regardless of whether their focus is on institutional 
development or not. The results indeed indicate that World Bank aid projects positively impact 
reported confidence in institutions, albeit subject to two important qualifiers: the observed effect 
appears relatively local and takes some time to materialize.  
 Table 1 presents the results using a 10 km cut-off. To begin with, the estimations demonstrate 
the importance of taking the non-random selection of World Bank project sites into account. The 
coefficient on Future is consistently negative and statistically significant, suggesting that World 
Bank projects tend to be located in areas where citizens had lower confidence in institutions prior 
to project implementation. To account for this tendency, we subtract the parameter on Future from 
that of Ongoing and Completed, respectively. The concerned parameter differences (βongoing −




Table 1: The impact of World Bank aid projects, irrespective of sector, on perceived institutional quality within a 10 km cut-off. Dependent variable is inst_index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 





















            
Any ongoing -0.027 -0.012 -0.025 -0.056*** -0.026 -0.043*** 0.032 -0.004    
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.035) (0.024)    
Any completed 0.015 0.031* 0.015 -0.003 0.015 0.032* 0.072 -0.006  0.044  
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.058) (0.023)  (0.034)  
Future -0.070** -0.048* -0.066** -0.082*** -0.085** -0.049**  -0.100*** -0.071***   
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.038) (0.027)   
Only ongoing         -0.032   
         (0.024)   
Ongoing and completed         -0.009   
         (0.018)   
Only completed         0.002  0.099** 
         (0.025)  (0.045) 
Diff ongoing-future 0.0427 0.0363 0.0414 0.0253 0.0591 0.00573  0.0962    
F test ongoing-future=0 1.637 1.846 1.544 0.909 2.064 0.0490  4.487    
P value of F test 0.201 0.174 0.214 0.340 0.151 0.825  0.0342    
Diff completed-future 0.0845 0.0797 0.0816 0.0786 0.0991 0.0812  0.0946    
F test compl-future=0 7.584 7.400 7.031 6.065 8.824 8.095  5.27    
P value of F test 0.00591 0.00654 0.00803 0.0138 0.00298 0.00445  0.0218    
Observations 73,640 73,640 72,525 55,137 73,640 73,640 24,818 53,750 73,640 19,850 8,607 
R-squared 0.030 0.075 0.031 0.028 0.030 0.050 0.104 0.027 0.030 0.041 0.036 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country (or region, when specified) fixed 
effects; Column 3 excludes all respondents in enumeration areas further than 100 km away from any World Bank projects site; Column 4 excludes Afrobarometer survey wave 6 (which contains no 
observations connected to future project sites); Column 5 restricts the pre-treatment group to respondents living close to sites where projects will start within a maximum of five years of the interview 
date; Column 6 controls for country-year fixed effects; Column 7 restricts the sample to respondents in enumeration areas that the Afrobarometer (despite not having a panel structure) happened to 
revisit before and after a project was initiated or completed, allowing for the inclusion of project fixed effects (note that there is no need to compare with sites of future projects in this setup). Column 
8 introduces a control for the respondent belonging to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time of the survey. The coefficient on the control (not presented) is 0.06, statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level; Column 9 breaks down the treatment groups (ongoing and completed) into sub-categories specifying if the respondent lives within the cut-off distance of only ongoing 
projects, both ongoing and completed projects, or only completed projects. The difference onlyongoing-future= 0.038, with p-value 0.283, the difference ongoingandcompleted-future=0.062, with p-
value 0.0365, the difference onlycompleted-future=0.073, with p-value 0.0367; Columns 10 and 11 focus on a restricted sample consisting only of respondents living within the cut-off distance of a 
future or a completed World Bank project. Column 10 focuses on the parameter of having any completed project nearby (and includes respondents living in areas close to both a completed and an 
ongoing project). Column 11 focuses on the parameter of having only completed projects in the vicinity, and thus restricts the sample further (excluding also respondents living in areas close to both a 




 People living within 10 km of with a completed project site report significantly higher 
confidence in institutions than people living within the cutoff distance of a future project site (the 
Column 1 parameter difference βcompleted − βfuture is equivalent to 8.5 percent of a standard 
deviation on the institutional index). Interestingly, and in line with the idea that institutional change 
is a slow process, the results do not suggest an equivalent effect of having an ongoing project in 
the vicinity. The estimated parameter on Ongoing is less negative than that on Future (βongoing −
βfuture is positive) but the difference is not statistically significant.  
 This pattern is consistent across a wide range of alternative specifications. The benchmark 
estimation controls for variation in average levels of perceived institutional quality across 
countries. Central to our argument, however, institutional quality likely varies systematically 
within as well as across countries, depending on differences in local governance and institutional 
infrastructure. Controlling for sub-national variation involves a trade-off between losing variation 
and controlling for potential sources of bias. While sub-national fixed effects may absorb variation 
in institutional quality that is in fact due to aid, i.e. variation that we want our aid indicators to pick 
up, they also help control for regional variation unrelated to aid, that would otherwise bias our aid 
estimates. Reassuringly, including, sub-national region fixed effects (Column 2) does not change 
the interpretation of results.  
 Furthermore, the results are robust to dropping all respondents in enumeration areas further 
than 100 km away from World Bank projects sites (Column 3). This form of geographical 
matching is useful since it controls for unobserved factors that may vary within administrative sub-
national regions (Briggs, 2019), thus helping to make the pre-, ongoing- and post-treatment groups 
more comparable with the no-treatment group. 
 As discussed in Section 3.1, a potential concern would be if future/ongoing/completed project 
status picks up project timing and projects starting later differ systematically from projects starting 
earlier. As noted, there is no direct correspondence between time of project implementation and 
project status. A project implemented comparatively early may well be coded as a future project, 
all depending on at what point in time the Afrobarometer surveyed that particular area. That said, 
however, there is an over-representation of respondents connected to ongoing and completed 
project sites in the later survey waves. And at the time of wave 6, all projects included in the dataset 
had already been initiated, meaning that there are no respondents connected to future project sites 
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in this round. Including wave 6 comes with the benefit of a significantly larger sample. 
Reassuringly, however, excluding observations from wave 6 (Column 4) the observed pattern 
remains.  
 In the benchmark setup, the variable Future captures respondents living close to a site where 
we know that a World Bank project will be implemented at a later stage. It places no restriction on 
how far ahead of the survey date project implementation starts. A potential concern is that 
circumstances in the area may change between survey date and project start, affecting the 
comparability of the treatment (ongoing and completed) and pre-treatment groups. The estimation 
in Column 5 restricts the pre-treatment group to respondents living close to sites where projects 
will start within a maximum of five years of the interview date (which applies for 67 percent of 
the concerned group). The main results remain unchanged.  While considering an even narrower 
time bandwidth may further improve comparability, it comes at the cost of having to extrapolate 
from a small pre-treatment group.9 With this caveat in mind, we can note that the results hold for 
varying the time restriction, from future projects starting within five years of the interview data to 
future projects starting within a year (Figure A1). 
 In the benchmark setup, country and year fixed effects account for variation in average levels 
of perceived institutional quality across time and space. However, time trends in institutional 
quality (and perceptions thereof) are likely to vary across countries, e.g. due to reforms. 
Reassuringly, the benchmark result withstands controls for country-year fixed effects (Column 6). 
 As noted, the Afrobarometer is not a panel, and only in some cases happens to revisit the same 
localities in different survey waves. Column 7 restricts the sample to respondents in enumeration 
areas that the Afrobarometer happened to revisit before and after a project was initiated or 
completed, allowing for the inclusion of project fixed effects. The advantage of using project fixed 
effects is that it allows us to evaluate variation in citizens’ willingness to abide by institutions in 
the same location over time, before and after the World Bank implemented a project in the area 
(without having to compare with future project sites). This, however, means we lose a large share 
                                                          
9 In the benchmark estimation, with no time restriction, 6.5 percent of respondents live within 10 km of a future project 
site (and not close to any ongoing projects). With a five year cut-off this share goes down to around 4.3 percent, and 
with a one year cut-off it is below 1 percent.   
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of our sample. Nonetheless, the estimated parameters follow the expected pattern, albeit less 
precisely estimated.  
 A common argument is that African policy-makers tend to favour their own homelands and 
ethnic groups in the allocation of funds (see e.g. Wantchekon 2003; Alesina et al. 2016; Isaksson, 
2020). Against this background, one may suspect that co-ethnics of the president are more pleased 
with current economic and political conditions – potentially spilling over on a greater willingness 
to abide by state institutions – than are members of other groups. Moreover, taking into account 
that members of the same ethnic group often live geographically clustered, we cannot rule out that 
co-ethnics of the president also differ systematically in terms of aid exposure, and hence that ethnic 
affiliations could bias our estimates. The estimation presented in Column 8 introduces a control 
variable for the respondent belonging to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time 
of the survey. Reassuringly, the key results remain unchanged.10 
 In the benchmark setup we focus on dummies for having any ongoing or any completed 
project within the cut-off distance. These categories are not mutually exclusive; a respondent might 
well have both ongoing and completed projects in their vicinity. To get a more detailed picture of 
the effects of living near projects at different stages of the implementation process, Column 9 
breaks down these treatment categories into three groups: those with only ongoing projects within 
the cut-off distance, those with both ongoing and completed projects within the cut-off distance, 
and those with only completed projects within the cut-off distance. In line with the benchmark 
results, and with idea that institutional change takes time, there is no statistically significant 
difference in scores on our institutional index between people living near future projects and 
people living near only ongoing projects. The parameters on the treatment variables capturing 
greater project maturity – having both ongoing and completed projects in the vicinity, or having 
only completed projects within the cut-off distance – are on the other hand both significantly larger 
than that on living near a future project. While as expected, the estimated parameter on living near 
only completed projects is larger than that of living near both ongoing and completed projects, the 
difference between the two is not statistically significant.   
                                                          
10 As may be expected, co-ethnics of the president express a greater willingness to abide by the concerned institutions 
(the co-ethnic dummy parameter, not presented in the table, is approximately 0.06, and statistically significant at the 
one percent level). 
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 Columns 10 and 11 focus on a restricted sample consisting only of respondents living within 
the cut-off distance of a completed or a future World Bank project site. Hence, rather than 
comparing the estimated effects in relation to those not living close to any project and subtracting 
the selection effect from our treatment effect, as in the benchmark setup, we here directly compare 
respondents with a completed or future project within the cut-off distance. Considering that our 
results thus far only suggest a positive impact of completed projects, we omit respondents 
connected to ongoing projects from this comparison. Column 10 focuses on the parameter of 
having any completed project nearby (and includes respondents living in areas close to both a 
completed and an ongoing project). Column 11 focuses on the parameter of having only completed 
projects in the vicinity, and thus restricts the sample further (excluding respondents living in areas 
close to both a completed and an ongoing project). Both come out positive, but the latter is more 
precisely estimated, again in line with the idea that institutional change takes time.  
 Furthermore, the key results remain unchanged when specifying our dependent variable 
differently (see Table A4 in the Appendix). First, using an additive institutional index rather than 
the original index based on principal component analysis does not change the results. And 
similarly, breaking down the institutional index into its component variables (the expressed 
willingness to abide by the courts, the police and the tax authority, respectively) and running 
separate regressions with these variables as dependent variable does not alter our main findings. 
The difference between people living near completed and future project sites (βcompleted −
βfuture) is consistently positive and, in all but one estimation,11 statistically significant.  
 As seen in Table 1, the positive effect of living within 10 km of completed as compared to 
future projects is consistent across a wide range of specifications. As it turns out, this effect is less 
precisely estimated when considering a wider geographical cut-off – 25 km instead of 10 km – 
around project sites. We summarize the estimated parameter differences between having a 
completed and a future World Bank project within a 10 and 25 km cut-off, respectively, in Figure 
2 (a detailed presentation of the 25 km cut-off results can be found in Table A5). While 
βcompleted − βfuture is consistently positive, it is only weakly statistically significant when 
restricting the pre-treatment group to respondents living close to sites where projects will start 
within a maximum of five years of the interview date. When focusing on a restricted sample 
                                                          
11 The one focusing on the expressed willingness to abide by court decisions.  
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consisting only of respondents living within the cut-off distance of a future or completed World 
Bank project, however, the parameter on having only completed projects nearby is indeed positive 
and statistically significant (Column 11, Table A5). 
 
Figure 2: Estimated effects of overall World Bank aid. Dep. var. is inst_index [IN COLOUR] 
 10 km cut-off 25 km cut-off 
  
Notes: Estimated effect with 95% confidence intervals; The estimations correspond to those presented in Tables 1 and AX, but excluding the 
estimations not focusing on a the parameter difference between any_completed and future (i.e. the project fixed effect estimation, the estimation 
where we break down the 2 treatment groups into 3 sub-treatment-categories, and the estimations restricting the sample to respondents living 
near completed and future project sites). 
 
In sum, the results from this set of estimations indicate that even aid projects not necessarily 
targeted at institutional development come with measurable benefits for local institutions. The 
observed effect concerns finalized projects, not projects still under implementation, however, and 
is precisely estimated only for a narrowly defined geographic area around project sites. The fact 
that we see no effect of projects during their implementation phase is in line with the idea that 
institutional change is a slow process. However, it could also reflect negative signaling effects of 
aid during the project implementation phase. As noted, according to fiscal contract theory, a 
significant donor presence may signal that the government is performing badly, since apparently 
it has been unable to finance the concerned development project on its own, via taxes. Wanting to 
disentangle such signaling effects from de facto institutional improvements, it is useful to compare 
effects of aid projects at different points in the project implementation cycle. In particular, 
considering that signaling effects are likely to be most pronounced when donors are visible, i.e. 
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project implementation, when the donor is not present in the area, capture real institutional 
developments.  
 Bearing in mind that aid is given for many purposes other than institutional development, and 
that such aid projects may obscure the effect of projects actually targeted at institution building, in 
the next section we will restrict our attention to projects focusing on institutional development 
more directly.  
 
 4.2 Aid projects targeted at institutional development 
As it turns out, the estimated effects when focusing on World Bank aid more directly targeted at 
institutional development (Table 2, Figure 3, Table A6) are indeed stronger. Again, the coefficient 
on Future is consistently negative and statistically significant, suggesting that World Bank projects 
targeted at institutional development tend to be located in areas with lower perceived institutional 
quality prior to project implementation. And again, it is the effect of completed rather than ongoing 
projects that stands out. People with a completed project within the cut-off distance consistently 
report significantly higher willingness to abide by the concerned state institutions than people 
living within the cut-off distance of a future project site (the parameter difference βcompleted −
βfuture in the benchmark estimation in Table 2 is equivalent to 13 percent of a standard deviation 
on the institutional index). 
 Not only are the results consistent across all specifications discussed in the previous section, 
i.e. all specifications in Table 2 as well as the estimations using different time restrictions on the 
pre-treatment group (Figure A1) and those specifying our dependent variable differently (Table 
A4), the effect of completed projects also has a larger geographical reach. As seen in Tables A6 
and Figure 3, the results are consistent when using a 10 and 25 km cut-off. In addition, they display 
the same pattern when using a 50, 75 and 100 km cut-off (Figure 4). 
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Table 2: The impact of World Bank aid projects targeted at institutional development on perceived institutional quality within a 10 km cut-off. Dependent variable is inst_index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Benchmark Region FEs Geo-match Exclude  
wave 6 
Future 
 within 5 
Country-year 
FEs 












            
Any ongoing -0.044 -0.018 -0.043 -0.014 -0.040 -0.012 -0.028 -0.070    
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.029) (0.110) (0.047)    
Any completed 0.054 0.042 0.047 0.003 0.055* 0.031 0.314** 0.075**  0.132**  
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.155) (0.037)  (0.063)  
Future -0.077** -0.051 -0.074** -0.082*** -0.079* -0.090***  -0.042 -0.072**   
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.041) (0.031)  (0.043) (0.031)   
Only ongoing         -0.006   
         (0.039)   
Ongoing and completed         -0.035   
         (0.043)   
Only completed         0.104**  0.117* 
         (0.045)  (0.070) 
Diff ongoing-future 0.0333 0.0335 0.0303 0.0679 0.0384 0.0785  -0.0287    
F test ongoing-future=0 0.590 0.605 0.473 2.241 0.609 3.761  0.225    
P value of F test 0.442 0.437 0.492 0.135 0.435 0.0525  0.635    
Diff completed-future 0.131 0.0936 0.120 0.0853 0.134 0.121  0.117    
F test compl-future=0 7.933 3.546 6.453 3.490 6.057 8.200  4.13    
P value of F test 0.00488 0.0598 0.0111 0.0618 0.0139 0.00421  0.0422    
Observations 47,705 47,705 40,637 35,057 47,705 47,705 7,789 35,332 47,705 5,419 3,656 
R-squared 0.025 0.058 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.037 0.098 0.022 0.025 0.033 0.047 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country (or region, when specified) fixed 
effects; Column 3 excludes all respondents in enumeration areas further than 100 km away from any World Bank projects site; Column 4 excludes Afrobarometer survey wave 6 (which contains no 
observations connected to future project sites); Column 5 restricts the pre-treatment group to respondents living close to sites where projects will start within a maximum of five years of the interview 
date; Column 6 controls for country-year fixed effects; Column 7 restricts the sample to respondents in enumeration areas that the Afrobarometer (despite not having a panel structure) happened to 
revisit before and after a project was initiated or completed, allowing for the inclusion of project fixed effects (note that there is no need to compare with sites of future projects in this setup). Column 
8 introduces a control for the respondent belonging to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time of the survey. The coefficient on the control (not presented) is 0.07, statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level; Column 9 breaks down the treatment groups (ongoing and completed) into sub-categories specifying if the respondent lives within the cut-off distance of only ongoing 
projects, both ongoing and completed projects, or only completed projects. The difference onlyongoing-future= 0.067, with p-value 0.1447, the difference ongoingandcompleted-future=0.037, with p-
value 0.4658, the difference onlycompleted-future=0.176, with p-value 0.001; Columns 10 and 11 focus on a restricted sample consisting only of respondents living within the cut-off distance of a future 
or a completed World Bank project. Column 10 focuses on the parameter of having any completed project nearby (and includes respondents living in areas close to both a completed and an ongoing 
project). Column 11 focuses on the parameter of having only completed projects in the vicinity, and thus restricts the sample further (excluding also respondents living in areas close to both a completed 




Figure 3: Estimated effects of institutional World Bank aid. Dep. var. is inst_index [IN COLOUR] 
 10 km cut-off 25 km cut-off 
  
Notes: Estimated effect with 95% confidence intervals; The estimations correspond to those presented in Tables 2 and AX, but excluding the 
estimations not focusing on a the parameter difference between any_completed and future (i.e. the project fixed effect estimation, the estimation 
where we break down the 2 treatment groups into 3 sub-treatment-categories, and the estimations restricting the sample to respondents living 
near completed and future project sites). 
 
Figure 4: The impact of institutional World Bank aid projects when using 
different geographical cut-offs. Dep. var. is inst_index [IN COLOUR] 
 
Notes: Estimated effect with 95% confidence intervals  
 
 
Hence, while the results indicate that even aid projects not necessarily targeted at institutional 
development come with measurable benefits for local institutions, the effects are indeed stronger, 
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institution building.12 The result suggesting that it is completed projects rather than projects still 
under implementation that come with positive effects remains, however, in line with the idea that 
institutional change is a slow process. Considering that signaling effects are likely to be most 
pronounced when donors are visible, i.e. during the project implementation phase, we are, as noted, 
more confident that improvements observed post-project implementation, when the donor is not 
present in the area, capture real institutional developments. 
 
 4.3 Alternative identification strategy: Coarsened exact matching 
Our estimation strategy relies on the assumption that a similar selection process applies to sites 
where projects were ongoing, completed or not yet initiated at the time the survey. We evaluated 
possible effects of project timing above. Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the results we get in 
our benchmark setup with results obtained when relying on an alternative identification strategy, 
in particular considering the limited number of respondents connected to future project sites in 
some countries and survey waves. In this section, we instead use coarsened exact matching (CEM), 
with similar results. 
 The key goal of matching is to prune observations from the data so that the remaining data 
have better balance between the treated and control groups (Iacus et al., 2012). While the strategy 
is no magic bullet in terms of causal identification – just as standard regression frameworks, it 
relies on controlling for observable factors – matching has the advantage that it makes the potential 
lack of common support, or overlap in terms of covariates, between treatment and control group 
explicit (Isaksson, 2017). Using matching, we thus avoid drawing conclusions based on 
unreasonable extrapolations. 
 The basic idea of CEM, specifically, is to temporarily coarsen the data into substantively 
meaningful groups, then use exact matching on these coarsened data, and finally run the analysis 
on the original (un-coarsened) matched data (Iacus et al., 2012). The procedure has the advantage 
that it is transparent in the sense that the imbalance between the matched treated and control groups 
                                                          
12 Table A7 presents results of estimations focusing on World Bank projects to all sectors other than institutional aid. 
Interestingly, we observe some positive impacts here as well. The results are in line with those focusing on overall 
aid, i.e. suggesting a positive effect of living near completed projects when focusing on the smallest geographical cut-
off around project sites (10 km), but not when considering a wider area (25 km).  
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will not be larger than what is ex ante specified by the user, based in intuitive and substantive 
information.13  
  
Table 3: Estimating the impact of World Bank aid projects using coarsened exact matching (CEM). Dependent variable is inst_index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CEM  
10 km cut-off 
CEM  
25 km cut-off 
CEM + geo-matching  
10 km cut-off 
CEM + geo-matching  
25 km cut-off 
     
Panel A: World Bank projects, irrespective of sector 
Only completed 0.012  0.012  
 (0.017)  (0.017)  
Only completed  0.028*  0.028* 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Observations 56,515 58,161 55,684 57,273 
R-squared 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.013 
     
Panel B: World Bank projects targeted at institutional development 
Only completed 0.087***  0.092***  
 (0.025)  (0.026)  
Only completed  0.038*  0.037* 
  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Observations     
R-squared 28,886 31,825 24,963 27,221 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We focus on only having completed projects within the cut-off distance, i.e. the treatment 
capturing greatest project maturity, for which we get clear results in the original setup. Table 3 
presents the results. We can note that for overall World Bank aid (Panel A), the estimated effect 
of living near a completed project is positive, and statistically significant at the ten percent level 
when focusing on a 25 km cut-off around project sites (Column 2). For aid targeted at institutional 
development (Panel B), the results are again stronger, the estimated effect being larger and 
statistically significant at the one percent level when using 10 km geographical cut-off, and 
statistically significant at ten percent when using a 25 km cut-off. In Columns 3 and 4 we narrow 
                                                          
13 In comparison, and as discussed in Iacus et al. (2012), approximate matching methods such as propensity score 
matching require the user to set the matching algorithm ex ante, and then check for balance ex post. That is, the user 
checks for balance after the algorithm is finished, and if balance is not satisfied, re-specifies the matching model and 
re-checks balance, etc. until obtaining an acceptable amount of balance. The process often needs to be repeated 
multiple times because any change in the matching algorithm (e.g. including higher order terms and interactions) may 
alter balance in unpredictable ways. CEM is more transparent. In this specific case, for instance, we matched exactly 
on the country dummies, and on the urban and female dummies, but coarsened the age indicator into age brackets and 




the comparison groups further, applying CEM on a geographically matched sub-sample (excluding 
respondents in enumeration areas further than 100 km away from any World Bank projects site, as 
in Column 3 in Tables 1-2). The results do not change. 
 Hence, when using coarsened exact matching rather than our benchmark spatial-temporal 
estimation strategy, the results again seem to suggest that even aid projects not necessarily targeted 
at institutional development come with benefits for local institutions, but the effects are once again 
stronger and more robust when considering projects focusing more directly on institution building. 
 
4.4 Comparing across donors 
The geo-coded aid data at hand does not allow for systematic donor comparisons. Other donors do 
not routinely geo-code their aid, meaning that the data available is patchy, at best. What we can 
do, however, is explore patterns for selected donors in selected recipient countries.  Table 4 
presents results of estimations focusing on US aid to Uganda and on Chinese aid to Kenya, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda.  
 To begin with, there is relatively good coverage of US aid to Uganda; after sample restrictions, 
we have data on 324 project sites across the country, out of which 68 can be said to target 
institutional development (judging from their sectoral classification). Columns 1-2 present the 
results of estimations focusing on overall US aid to Uganda and Columns 3-4 on the subset of 
these projects targeted at institutional development. In line with the results for World Bank aid, 
people living near completed projects report a significantly greater willingness to abide by the 
concerned institutions than people living within the cut-off distance of a future project site. For 
overall US aid to Uganda, the estimated parameter differences (βcompleted − βfuture) are 
equivalent to 13-15 percent of a standard deviation on the institutional index. Considering 
institutional aid, the estimated impact is again more pronounced (28 and 44 percent of a standard 
deviation on the institutional index when using a 10 and 25 km cut-off, respectively), as well as 
more precisely estimated.  Once again, the results do not suggest an equivalent effect of having an 
ongoing project in the vicinity. Indeed, for US aid to Uganda, the estimated effect of living near 
an ongoing project (βongoing − βfuture) is negative, and statistically significant when using a 25 
km cut-off. In line with previous discussion, this could reflect negative signaling effects (or for 
that matter, an obstructive influence) of aid during the project implementation phase. 
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Table 4: Donor comparison. Dependent variable is inst_index   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Overall US aid  
to Uganda:  
10 km cutoff 
Overall US aid 
 to Uganda:  
25 km cutoff 
Institutional US aid  
to Uganda:  
10 km cutoff 
Institutional US aid  
to Uganda:  
25 km cutoff 
Overall Chinese aid  
to six country sample:  
10 km cutoff 
Overall Chinese aid  
to six country sample:  
25 km cutoff 
       
Any ongoing -0.097* -0.191*** -0.136* -0.326*** -0.073* -0.007 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.070) (0.061) (0.037) (0.032) 
Any (nearly alt. clearly) completed 0.139** 0.134** 0.185** 0.334*** 0.025 -0.032 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.094) (0.078) (0.028) (0.028) 
Future -0.014 0.007 -0.093** -0.104*** -0.031 -0.066** 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.040) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) 
Diff ongoing-future -0.0826 -0.198 -0.0436 -0.222 -0.0426 0.0591 
F test ongoing-future=0 2.002 9.773 0.286 9.920 0.687 1.485 
p value of F test 0.157 0.00181 0.593 0.00168 0.407 0.223 
Diff completed-future 0.153 0.127 0.278 0.438 0.0550 0.0345 
F test completed-future=0 4.473 2.853 7.526 27.27 1.402 0.662 
P value of F test 0.0347 0.0915 0.00617 2.09e-07 0.236 0.416 
Observations 11,386 11,386 11,386 11,386 44,518 44,518 
R-squared 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.033 0.058 0.058 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and region fixed effects; In the estimations focusing 
on US aid to Uganda (Columns 1-4), completed refers to ‘nearly completed’ projects that have ended in previous years or within the same year as the survey (due to very few projects ending in previous 
years). In columns 5-6 focusing on Chinese aid, we use the standard completed variable including only projects that have ended in years prior to the survey year. The sample in the estimations focusing 




 While the positive impact of completed US projects in Uganda are in line with our benchmark 
findings for World Bank aid, we cannot be sure that this result would hold in a large multi-country 
sample. Conversely, it should be noted that the World Bank results, which are robust in a large 
multi-country sample, do not hold when looking at Uganda alone. The reason for this is 
presumably that there are very few respondents living within the specified cut-off distances of 
future World Bank projects in Uganda.14 
 The estimations in Columns 5 and 6 instead consider overall Chinese aid to Kenya, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda,15 obtained from AidData’s Geocoded Global Chinese 
Official Finance Version 1.1.1 dataset (Bluhm et al. 2018). Since the Chinese government does 
not release official, project-level financial information about its foreign aid activities, this data is 
based on an open-source media based data collection technique, synthesizing and standardizing 
information on Chinese development finance to African countries.16 The results provide no 
indication of a positive effect of Chinese aid on local citizens expressed willingness to abide by 
institutions. This is arguably not surprising, seeing that the concerned Chinese aid flows considered 
contain very few projects targeted at institutional development (too few to consider them 
separately). Notably though, unlike recent empirical evidence suggesting negative externalities of 
Chinese aid to Africa (see e.g. Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018a; Isaksson, 2020), there is no 
evidence of a negative effect either; the estimations suggest no statistically significant difference 
in institutional index scores between people living near future, ongoing and completed Chinese 
projects.  
 A thorough assessment of donor heterogeneity in the effects of aid on local institutional 
quality would require more complete geo-coded aid data. At this stage, we can merely note that 
compared to the findings we get for World Bank aid, estimations for other selected donors suggest 
both common ground (the positive impact of completed US projects in Uganda) and the existence 
of donor heterogeneity in results (the lack of evidence for an impact of Chinese projects). 
                                                          
14 For World Bank institutional aid to Uganda, these figures are indeed too low to allow for sensible estimation using 
the estimation strategy at hand: 0.4 percent of respondents live within 10 km of a future project site, and 1.6 percent 
of respondents live within 25 km of the same.  
15 We limit the sample to the sub-sample of countries in the World Bank estimation dataset that also contain a sufficient 
number of observations within the cut-off distance of both future, ongoing and completed Chinese projects. Using this 
restricted sample in estimations focusing on World Bank aid, the results remain qualitatively the same as in the 
benchmark setup.   




 5 Conclusions 
 
Motivated by the lack of sub-national empirical evidence on the relationship between aid and 
institutional development, this study explored the local effects of aid on perceived institutional 
quality in African aid receiving countries. 
 While the importance of building well-functioning state institutions in developing countries 
is uncontroversial, the question of whether donors are actually helpful in this process is more 
contentious. Aid optimists argue that an inflow of resources can help recipient countries boost 
government effectiveness and persuade states to embark on reform. Aid sceptics, on the other hand, 
maintain that aid promotes rent-seeking behavior and reduces the incentives for democratic 
accountability and thus the democratic pressures to build effective institutions. The mixed 
empirical evidence on the relationship between aid and institutions does little to resolve the 
controversy. One reason for the inconclusive results may be the tendency to study the relationship 
at the country level.  
 The aim of this study was to estimate the local effects of aid on institutions in African aid 
receiving countries, using citizens’ expressed willingness to abide by key formal institutions as a 
proxy for de facto institutional quality. We explored a) the local effects of overall World Bank aid, 
b) the local effects of World Bank aid targeted specifically at institutional development, and c) 
potential donor heterogeneity in results.  
 Doing so, we believe that we make a number of contributions. First, focusing on sub-national 
variation allows us to capture effects of targeted aid that may not be picked up at the country level. 
Second, we are better able to account for the non-random allocation of aid. The sub-national geo-
coded data on aid and institutional outcomes enabled us to compare localities affected and not 
affected by development projects – before and after development project implementation – while 
controlling for potential confounding and omitted variables at relatively fine geographic levels. 
Third, by focusing on citizens’ expressed willingness to abide by key formal institutions we hope 
to capture de facto as opposed de jure institutions, and thus avoid merely picking up shallow ‘form 
targets’, rather than ‘function targets’ capturing the actual effectiveness of institutions in 
addressing public problems. And finally, by exploring effects of different forms of aid as well as 
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donor heterogeneity in results, we address the concern that the aid effectiveness literature often 
aggregate over aid flows that, since provided for very different purposes, should have very 
different effects. 
 The empirical results, drawing on geocoded aid project data combined with geocoded survey 
data for 73,640 respondents across 12 African countries, suggest a positive impact of World Bank 
aid on perceptions of local institutional quality. This applies even if we consider World Bank aid 
to any sector, i.e. not just aid projects specifically targeted at institutional development. As may 
be expected, however, the estimated effects are indeed more pronounced when restricting our 
attention to projects focusing on institution building. Notably, the observed effects concern 
finalized projects, not projects still under implementation. Unlike people living near an ongoing 
project, people with a completed project within the cut-off distance consistently report 
significantly higher willingness to abide by the concerned state institutions than people living 
within the same distance of a future project site. This pattern is stable across a wide range of 
alternative specifications. 
 The fact that we see no effect of projects during their implementation phase is in line with the 
idea that institutional change is a slow process, and thus that empirical studies focusing on 
institutional outcomes need to allow for changes to take time. However, it could also reflect 
negative signaling effects of aid during the project implementation phase; a significant donor 
presence may signal that the government is performing badly. Considering that signaling effects 
are likely to be most pronounced when donors are visible, i.e. during the project implementation 
phase, we are more confident that improvements observed post-project completion, when the 
donor is not present in the area, capture real institutional developments.  
 A thorough assessment of donor heterogeneity in the effects of aid on local institutional 
quality would require more complete geo-coded aid data. At this stage, we can merely note that 
compared to the findings we get for World Bank aid, estimations for other selected donors suggest 
both common ground and the existence of donor heterogeneity in results. 
 The results are encouraging in that they suggest a positive impact of World Bank aid, and 
particularly so of aid targeted at institutional development, on local institutions in African aid 
receiving countries. For studies of aid effectiveness more generally, our findings call attention to 
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Table A1: Variable descriptions 
 
Dependent variable  
Inst_index: The first principal component of the responses to questions on whether the respondents agree or disagree that a) courts, b) the police 
and c) the tax authority has the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by (with response categories ranging from 1 for 
strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree). 
 
Key explanatory variables: Proximity to World Bank project sites 
Any_ongoing: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within XX km of a site where a World Bank aid project is being implemented at 
the time of the interview, zero otherwise. 
Any_completed: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within XX km of a completed World Bank project, zero otherwise. Note that 
any_ongoing and any_completed are not mutually exclusive; respondents could have both ongoing and completed projects within the 
cut-off distance. 
Future: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within XX km of a World Bank project site where the implementation of the project 
had not yet started at the time of the interview and do not have any ongoing or completed project within this same distance, zero 
otherwise. 
Only_ongoing: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within XX km of a site where a World Bank aid project is being implemented at 
the time of the interview but do not have any completed World Bank projects within the same distance, zero otherwise. 
Ongoing_and_completed: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within XX km of both ongoing and completed World Bank aid 
projects, zero otherwise.  
Only_compled: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within XX km of a completed World Bank project and do not have any ongoing 
projects within the same distance, zero otherwise. 
 
Individual control variables 
Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise. 
Urban: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in an urban area; zero otherwise. 
Age: Age in years  
Age squared: Age in years squared (/100) 
Presethnic: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent belongs to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time of the survey. Based 
on self-reported group affiliation using the question: “What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?”. coupled with externally 
compiled data on the ethnic background of the president at the time of the survey.  For the ethnic groups of president, we consult at least 
two sources for each country, drawing most heavily on the compilation in Dreher et al (2015), when necessary updated with more recent 
data from other sources (e.g. encyclopedia britannica, wikipedia, aljazeera, washington post, africareview.com etc. ). 
 
Alternative dependent variables 
Additive inst. index: An additive index of the responses to questions on whether the respondents agree or disagree that a) courts, b) the police and 
c) the tax authority has the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by (with response categories ranging from 1 for 
strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree). 
Abide by court: Whether the respondent agrees or disagrees that the courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by, 
with response categories ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree. 
Abide by police: Whether the respondent agrees or disagrees that the police has the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by, 
with response categories ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree. 
Abide by tax authority: Whether the respondent agrees or disagrees that the tax authority has the right to make decisions that people always have 
to abide by, with response categories ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree. 
 
Year and spatial fixed effects 
Year dummies: Dummies for interview year, 2002-2015 
Country dummies: Dummies for the 12 countries in the sample 
Country-year dummies: interacting the full set of year dummies with the full set of country dummies  




Table A2: Summary statistics for key variables      
 Overall World Bank aid World Bank aid projects targeted at institutional development 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable           
Inst_index 73,640 0.000 1 -2.949 1.317 47,705 0 1 -3,059 1,263 
Aid variables           
Any_ongoing10 73,640 0.295 0.456 0 1 47,705 0,090 0,287 0 1 
Any_completed10 73,640 0.204 0.403 0 1 47,705 0,075 0,264 0 1 
Future10 73,640 0.065 0.247 0 1 47,705 0,038 0,192 0 1 
Only_ongoing10 73,640 0.143 0.350 0 1 47,705 0,053 0,225 0 1 
Ongoing_and_completed10 73,640 0.153 0.360 0 1 47,705 0,037 0,189 0 1 
Only_compled10 73,640 0.052 0.221 0 1 47,705 0,039 0,192 0 1 
Any_ongoing25 73,640 0.563 0.496 0 1 47,705 0,192 0,394 0 1 
Any_completed25 73,640 0.401 0.490 0 1 47,705 0,162 0,368 0 1 
Future25 73,640 0.095 0.294 0 1 47,705 0,074 0,261 0 1 
Only_ongoing25 73,640 0.231 0.421 0 1 47,705 0,106 0,308 0 1 
Ongoing_and_completed25 73,640 0.333 0.471 0 1 47,705 0,086 0,280 0 1 
Only_completed25 73,640 0.069 0.253 0 1 47,705 0,076 0,264 0 1 
Individual controls           
Age 73,640 35.874 14.032 18 100 47,705 36,005 13,810 18 99 
Age squared (/100) 73,640 14.838 12.303 3.24 100 47,705 14,871 12,070 3.24 98.01 
Female 73,640 0.488 0.500 0 1 47,705 0,487 0,500 0 1 
Urban 73,640 0.332 0.471 0 1 47,705 0,277 0,447 0 1 
Presethnic 53,750 0.142 0.349 0 1 35,332 0,160 0,367 0 1 
Alternative dependent variables           
Additive inst. index 73,640 11.283 2.813 3 15 47,705 11,477 2,778 3 15 
Abide by court 73,640 3.785 1.165 1 5 47,705 3,853 1,157 1 5 
Abide by police 73,640 3.828 1.149 1 5 47,705 3,900 1,144 1 5 





Table A3: Sample balance 
 Overall World Bank aid World Bank aid projects targeted at institutional dev. 
Dependent variable is: Age Female Urban Age Female Urban 
       
any_ongoing10 -0.649*** 0.003** 0.288*** -1.290*** 0.004 0.425*** 
 (0.174) (0.001) (0.017) (0.346) (0.003) (0.033) 
any_completed10 -1.021*** 0.003* 0.268*** -1.841*** 0.005 0.359*** 
 (0.197) (0.001) (0.020) (0.342) (0.003) (0.039) 
future10 -0.373 0.002 0.169*** -2.373*** 0.006 0.473*** 
 (0.346) (0.003) (0.033) (0.429) (0.004) (0.042) 
Diff ongoing-future -0.276 0.000995 0.119 1.083 -0.00180 -0.0480 
F test ongoing-future=0 0.545 0.148 14.46 4.349 0.134 0.994 
P value of F test 0.461 0.701 0.000144 0.0371 0.715 0.319 
Diff completed-future -0.648 0.000526 0.0990 0.532 -0.000839 -0.114 
F test completed-future=0 2.666 0.0328 5.861 0.893 0.0249 4.071 
P value of F test 0.103 0.856 0.0155 0.345 0.875 0.0437 
Observations 79,546 79,546 79,546 51,358 51,358 51,358 
R-squared 0.043 0.000 0.245 0.029 0.000 0.224 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include country and year FEs 
 
 
Table A4: Using alternative dependent variables (and a 10 km cut-off around project sites)     
 Overall aid Institutional aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Additive inst. 
index 




Abide by courts Abide by police Abide by tax 
authority 
         
Any ongoing -0.075 -0.035* -0.024 -0.012 -0.123 -0.066* -0.008 -0.039 
 (0.055) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.100) (0.038) (0.030) (0.043) 
Any completed 0.043 -0.027 0.022 0.044* 0.155* 0.016 0.053* 0.077** 
 (0.055) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) (0.093) (0.035) (0.031) (0.039) 
Future -0.197** -0.068** -0.054** -0.077** -0.204** -0.159*** -0.061* 0.018 
 (0.077) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.085) (0.039) (0.035) (0.032) 
Diff ongoing-future 0.122 0.0331 0.0300 0.0647 0.0809 0.0931 0.0533 -0.0570 
F test ongoing-future=0 1.668 0.660 1.163 2.620 0.447 3.641 1.521 1.222 
P value of F test 0.197 0.417 0.281 0.106 0.504 0.0564 0.217 0.269 
Diff completed-future 0.240 0.0411 0.0764 0.121 0.359 0.175 0.114 0.0587 
F test completed-future=0 7.789 1.598 4.945 12.77 7.681 10.18 5.884 1.328 
P value of F test 0.00527 0.206 0.0262 0.000355 0.00561 0.00143 0.0153 0.249 
Observations 73,645 76,705 77,649 74,857 47,705 49,508 50,113 48,518 
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.025 0.026 







Table A5: The impact of World Bank aid projects, irrespective of sector, on perceived institutional quality within a 25 km cut-off. Dependent variable is Inst_index. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 




















            
Any ongoing -0.056*** -0.032** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.048*** -0.026 -0.041**    
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.026) (0.018)    
Any completed -0.015 -0.007 -0.016 -0.034** -0.016 -0.022 0.012 -0.045**  -0.020  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.040) (0.018)  (0.030)  
Future -0.048** -0.022 -0.045** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.031  -0.056* -0.044**   
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)  (0.030) (0.021)   
Only ongoing         -0.047***   
         (0.018)   
Ongoing & completed         -0.070***   
         (0.016)   
Only completed         0.003  0.118*** 
         (0.023)  (0.039) 
Diff ongoing-future -0.00769 -0.0095 -0.0094 0.00543 0.00859 -0.0162  0.0156    
F test ongoing-future=0 0.124 0.195 0.184 0.0681 0.115 0.643  0.233    
P value of F test 0.725 0.659 0.668 0.794 0.734 0.423  0.629    
Diff completed-future 0.0329 0.0151 0.0291 0.0282 0.0482 0.00968  0.0111    
F test comp.-future=0 1.759 0.374 1.363 1.193 3.067 0.162  0.116    
p value of F test 0.185 0.541 0.243 0.275 0.0799 0.687  0.734    
Observations 73,640 73,640 72,525 55,137 73,640 73,640 42,883 53,750 73,640 36,578 12,079 
R-squared 0.031 0.075 0.031 0.028 0.031 0.050 0.096 0.028 0.031 0.043 0.042 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country (or region, when specified) fixed 
effects; Column 3 excludes all respondents in enumeration areas further than 100 km away from any World Bank projects site; Column 4 excludes Afrobarometer survey wave 6 (which contains no 
observations connected to future project sites); Column 5 restricts the pre-treatment group to respondents living close to sites where projects will start within a maximum of five years of the interview 
date; Column 6 controls for country-year fixed effects; Column 7 restricts the sample to respondents in enumeration areas that the Afrobarometer (despite not having a panel structure) happened to 
revisit before and after a project was initiated or completed, allowing for the inclusion of project fixed effects (note that there is no need to compare with sites of future projects in this setup). Column 
8 introduces a control for the respondent belonging to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time of the survey. The coefficient on the control (not presented) is 0.06, statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level; Column 9 breaks down the treatment groups (ongoing and completed) into sub-categories specifying if the respondent lives within the cut-off distance of only ongoing 
projects, both ongoing and completed projects, or only completed projects. Only the difference between only completed and future is close to statistically significant (with p-value 0.101); Columns 10 
and 11 focus on a restricted sample consisting only of respondents living within the cut-off distance of a future or a completed World Bank project. Column 10 focuses on the parameter of having any 
completed project nearby (and includes respondents living in areas close to both a completed and an ongoing project). Column 11 focuses on the parameter of having only completed projects in the 




Table A6: The impact of World Bank aid projects targeted at institutional development on perceived institutional quality within a 25 km cut-off. Dependent variable is Inst_index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 




















            
Any ongoing -0.055** -0.026 -0.053** -0.038 -0.052** -0.020 0.007 -0.071**    
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.074) (0.029)    
Any completed 0.054* 0.042 0.046 0.007 0.052* 0.006 0.222** 0.066**  0.113**  
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.088) (0.029)  (0.049)  
Future -0.073*** -0.050* -0.068*** -0.082*** -0.102*** -0.093***  -0.049 -0.073***   
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025)  (0.037) (0.025)   
Only ongoing         -0.055**   
         (0.028)   
Ongoing and 
completed 
        -0.002   
         (0.041)   
Only completed         0.054*  0.094* 
         (0.032)  (0.052) 
Diff ongoing-future 0.0186 0.0237 0.0153 0.0443 0.0498 0.0731  -0.0221    
F test ongoing-
future=0 
0.345 0.582 0.224 1.795 1.740 5.281  0.246    
P value of F test 0.557 0.446 0.636 0.180 0.187 0.0216  0.620    
Diff completed-future 0.127 0.0915 0.114 0.0896 0.154 0.0985  0.115    
F test compl-future=0 11.49 5.876 9.058 6.722 11.85 8.647  6.884    
P value of F test 0.000707 0.0154 0.00264 0.00957 0.000582 0.00330  0.00874    
Observations 47,705 47,705 40,637 35,057 47,705 47,705 16,014 35,332 47,705 11,218 7,114 
R-squared 0.025 0.059 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.038 0.081 0.022 0.025 0.038 0.040 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country (or region, when specified) fixed 
effects; Column 3 excludes all respondents in enumeration areas further than 100 km away from any World Bank projects site; Column 4 excludes Afrobarometer survey wave 6 (which contains no 
observations connected to future project sites); Column 5 restricts the pre-treatment group to respondents living close to sites where projects will start within a maximum of five years of the interview 
date; Column 6 controls for country-year fixed effects; Column 7 restricts the sample to respondents in enumeration areas that the Afrobarometer (despite not having a panel structure) happened to 
revisit before and after a project was initiated or completed, allowing for the inclusion of project fixed effects (note that there is no need to compare with sites of future projects in this setup). Column 
8 introduces a control for the respondent belonging to the same ethnic group as the country president at the time of the survey. The coefficient on the control (not presented) is 0.07, statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level; Column 9 breaks down the treatment groups (ongoing and completed) into sub-categories specifying if the respondent lives within the cut-off distance of only ongoing 
projects, both ongoing and completed projects, or only completed projects. The difference onlyongoing-future= 0.019, with p-value 0.584, the difference ongoingandcompleted-future=0.072, with p-
value 0.136, the difference onlycompleted-future=0.123, with p-value 0.001; Columns 10 and 11 focus on a restricted sample consisting only of respondents living within the cut-off distance of a future 
or a completed World Bank project. Column 10 focuses on the parameter of having any completed project nearby (and includes respondents living in areas close to both a completed and an ongoing 
project). Column 11 focuses on the parameter of having only completed projects in the vicinity, and thus restricts the sample further (excluding also respondents living in areas close to both a completed 




Table A7: Estimations focusing on World Bank aid to all sectors other than ‘institutional’. Dependent variable is Inst_index 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 10 km cut-off 25 km cut-off 
   
Any ongoing -0.017 -0.036** 
 (0.020) (0.015) 
Any completed 0.013 -0.018 
 (0.021) (0.016) 
Future -0.092*** -0.034 
 (0.031) (0.022) 
Diff. ongoing-future 0.0747 -0.00205 
F test ongoing-future=0 4.046 0.00753 
P value of F test 0.0443 0.931 
Diff completed-future 0.104 0.0161 
F test completed-future=0 9.022 0.368 
P value of F test 0.00268 0.544 
Observations 70,640 70,640 
R-squared 0.030 0.030 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey cluster) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and 







Figure A1: Estimated effects of World Bank aid when restricting the time span of the pre-treatment group. Dep. var. is inst_index 
 Overall WB aid  Institutional WB aid 
  
Notes: Estimated effect with 95% confidence intervals; Estimations equivalent to Column 5 in Tables 1-2, where we restricting the pre-treatment 
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